the argument by presenting it as one of several bases on which the court could grant relief. ' This hesitant approach may reflect not only a lack of faith in the strength of the argument, but also the difficulty in providing the historical detail necessary to convince a court to resurrect longdormant law." Even academic commentators, unconstrained by word limits and other considerations of appellate advocacy, have barely scratched the surface regarding the potential incorporation and application of the English right to counsel in America." Not surprisingly, the courts that squarely considered the argument all relied on historical uncertainty as a reason to reject the English right to counsel. One court particularly worried about practical concerns, such as when the right attaches and how long it contin-14 ues.
This Article attempts to fill in some of the missing history regarding the English right to counsel. Numerous sources confirm that this right was neither a myth nor a relic, but a right long recognized and invoked in English courts through well-established procedures addressing practical concerns. Beginning in colonial days, some American courts recognized and applied the English right to counsel and continued to do so after independence. Even states that did not exist at independence acknowledged the English right, though they had never been subject to English rule.
Civil Gideon arguments based on old English law thus seem to deserve more respect and consideration than they currently receive. Whether the English right to counsel applies in the various states depends upon whether and how each state has incorporated English law. But the history recounted in this Article should dispel 
11.
Cf Brief for King, supra note 9, at 21 (citing nothing apart from 11 Hen. 7, c. 12, an old English statute discussed infra at Part III); Brief for Frase, supra note 10, at 33-42 (citing eight sources, apart from 11 Hen. 7, c. 12).
12. 745-49 (1980) .
13.
See Hunt, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 457-58; Frase, 840 A.2d at 130 n.10; King, 174 P.3d at 667. In a Florida case, which took the form of a rule petition to the Florida Supreme Court, the court acknowledged the petitioners' argument that Florida law incorporates the English right to counsel and then simply ignored it. In re Amendments to Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 573 So. 2d at 802.
14.
Frase, 840 A.2d at 130 n.10.
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University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform most doubts regarding the existence and scope of, and the procedures employed under, the English right to counsel. It is also worth pointing out the "originalist" flavor of Civil Gideon arguments based on the old English right to counsel. Such arguments do not rely on abstract principles of justice or fairness, but on a developed body of real law from England. Courts are not called upon to invent new rights, but simply to perpetuate (or revive) old ones. This may be more attractive to history-minded judges, similar to the originalism-inspired revival of the Confrontation Clause in the U.S. Supreme Court.' 5 The English right to counsel may likewise appeal to judges who worry about circumventing the democratic process. By the terms of many states' incorporation statutes, the legislature can modify or repeal incorporated English law, as it could any other aspect of common law. The legislature thus has the final word.
This Article proceeds as follows: in Part I, we briefly discuss various types of English law incorporation statutes throughout the United States, and show that they are not a dead letter, as some might suppose. In Parts II and III, we present a historical analysis of the English right to counsel, and demonstrate that courts have long recognized it in England (Part II), and in America (Part III). Part IV delves into potential issues raised by attempting to apply the old English right to counsel today. Although such issues and their resolutions will vary from state to state, Part IV argues that courts should have broad discretion when implementing the right, as they would in dealing with any common law right. Accordingly, little basis remains for many of the historical and practical worries some have expressed about a modern American revival of the old English right to counsel.
I. ENGLISH LAW INCORPORATION IN AMERICA
By constitution or statute, many American states have incorporated English common law into their domestic laws. Most of these incorporation provisions contain three common elements: (1) a statement of the incorporated authority (i.e., only the common law, or the common law and statutes "in aid thereof'); (2) a disclaimer that English authority does not control if it contradicts local constitutions or laws, or is no longer "applicable"; and (3) a statement that the legislature can abrogate otherwise applicable
15.
See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42-50 (2004) .
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English authority. 6 Many of these incorporation provisions also contain a specific date (e.g., July 4, 1776), indicating that the English authority-as it existed in the colony at that time-controls.
7
As a matter of perpetuating the still-cherished "rights of Englishmen," and as a matter of continuity, incorporation made sense for states that had been British colonies.'
8 As other states joined the Union, however, they also incorporated English law, despite the lack of continuity with British colonial rule. Some states reached even farther back in time, before the beginning of colonial rule. For example, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, and Wyoming adopted English common law and related English statutes enacted "prior to the fourth year ofJames the First,"" that is, before 1607.20 16. Today, common law incorporation statutes (or constitutional provisions) remain on the books in at least twenty-seven states, and these statutes are not a dead letter. The Colorado Court of Appeals, for instance, held in 2006 that the English common law age of consent to marriage-fourteen for males and twelve for females-governs common law marriage in Colorado." In 1994, the Utah Court of Appeals held that the state attorney general possesses the powers of attorneys general under English common law. And in Florida, the legislature may not, without a powerful reason, abolish a tort cause of action derived from English common law." Accordingly, Civil Gideon proponents have reason to argue that old English law provides modern Americans (in some states, at least) with a right to court-appointed counsel when indigent. In states that did not begin as British colonies, the argument is even stronger because incorporating English law was not a matter of continuity (and therefore potentially subject to desuetude), but a deliberate choice to incorporate law that was already very old. As the Montana Supreme Court emphasized:
ALA
To whatever extent [English common law] has been in force, it was and is ours by adoption and not by inheritance. The territory embraced within this state was not a British possession in colonial days, and came under the influence of the common law only by virtue of an act of the first legislative as-
That first legislative assembly met in 1864-65 in Bannack, Montana -a gold-driven boomtown (nearly forgotten today) nestled in the Bitterroot Range, thousands of miles from both England and its former colonies on the East Coast. Presumably, a Civil War-era territorial legislature on the American frontier would not haphazardly 21 .
In 
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[VOL. 45:3 " Civil Gideon" Litigation choose to incorporate old English law if it did not intend its courts to take English law seriously.
II. THE ENGLISH RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Although arguments based on old English law may succeed in cases involving arcane areas such as common law marriage or the powers of the attorney general, we suspect that old English law is rarely used to support rights-based systemic change, such as a civil right to counsel. Before incorporating a right of such importance, courts will likely require extensive historical support. Yet, as far as we are aware, no case arguing for the English right to counsel (nor any academic treatment) has presented the history in sufficient detail to overcome the courts' understandable skepticism about the continuing viability of old English law regarding a civil counsel right.
The research presented in this Part demonstrates that the English right to counsel was real, widely recognized, and well developed. It had common law, statutory, and equitable incarnations. Standardized procedures eventually developed to govern its application. By the time that treatise writing came into vogue in the English bar in the 1700s and 1800s," the English right to civil counsel was seemingly as well developed as the Sixth Amendment right to criminal counsel in America today. Modem American state courts should not shy away from the English right to counsel on account of historical obscurity.
A. 11 Hen. 7, c. 12 and Antecedents
In 1495, Parliament noted the King's concern for "poor subjects [who] be not of ability nor power to sue according to the laws of [the] land for the redress of injuries and wrongs to them daily done."" The King "will[ed] and intend [ed] indifferent justice to be had and ministered according to his common laws to all his true subjects as well to poor as rich," 6 and Parliament responded with a
26.
See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
27.
A 
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[VOL. 45:3 "Civil Gideon" Litigation dently recounted that, as early as 1471, the King's Bench could compel serjeants-at-law-the most elite English attorneys at that time-to plead for poor persons.' Accordingly, it appears that the principles embodied in 11 Hen. 7, c. 12 existed at common law in at least some form before passage of the statute. Although 11 Hen. 7, c. 12 initially extended only to civil plaintiffs at law, courts of equity subsequently adopted the right to counsel and extended it to defendants," likely as early as 1570." Thus, indigent civil plaintiffs at law, and both plaintiffs and defendants in equity, could obtain counsel under 11 Hen. 7, c. 12 or its judge-made equitable equivalent. This right to counsel had enough prominence to catch Blackstone's attention. In his famous Commentaies, he verified that 11 Hen. 7, c. 12 entitled "paupers" to "counsel and attorney assigned them without fee." 3 8 Indeed, the term "informa paupeis" became a shorthand reference to the rights granted by 11 Hen. 7, c. 12.
B. Available Causes of Action
The statute 11 Hen. 7, c. 12 did not restrict its applicability to any particular causes of action. The only portion of the statute arguably addressing that issue is the preamble's description of the king's concern for the "wrongs ... daily done" to poor persons "as well concerning their persons [,] 
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University of Michigan journal of Law Reform false imprisonment." The English ecclesiastical courts-which for centuries governed bills for divorce--would also grant appointed counsel under circumstances similar to that of the courts of law and equity. 48 The only cause of action for which an indigent plaintiff could not obtain appointed counsel appears to be "an action on the case for words" (i.e., defamation) 49 and perhaps legal malpractice.o C. Procedure
Screening Meritless Claims or Unworthy Plaintiffs
Sir Francis Bacon, writing in 1622, denigrated 11 Hen. 7, c. 12 as a law "whereby poor men became rather able to vex than unable to sue."' Available sources indicate, however, that English courts of law and equity developed relatively standard rules to screen vexatious suits and not-poor-enough plaintiffs.
The most important screening mechanism was a relatively standardized application to invoke the right: a two-part application for prospective plaintiffs in law or equity, or a one-part application for defendants in equity. The first part of the application (for plaintiffs only) comprised a petition with a short statement of the case and an attorney's certification that the plaintiff had a merito- The second part of the application (for plaintiffs and defendants) was an affidavit swearing that the poor person's net worth was less than five pounds, exclusive of clothing." The origin of the fivepound requirement at common law is not clear, but the courts of equity borrowed the practice from common law as early as 1584, meaning the common law courts had likely adopted it some time before.
6 Once adopted, the five-pound threshold remained unchanged for hundreds of years.
7
If satisfied that the case had merit and the applicant was sufficiently poor, the court appointed an attorney to represent the litigant." One treatise writer stated that a pauper's court-appointed counsel could not refuse to serve "unless he satisfie [d] Numerous sources indicate that this "other punishment" was perverse: a choice between paying costs anyway or whipping and pillory. Matthew Bacon's treatise, for instance, states that "if [the pauper] be dispaupered or non-suited, the . . . usual practice is to tax the costs, and for non-payment to order him to be whipped.",65 Another source states "if the matter shall fall out against the Plaintiff, he shall be punished with whipping and pillory.""" This source further states that a female litigant was ordered flogged under this practice in 1596, but it contains nothing about whether the order
60.
Coulsting v. Coulsting, (1845) was executed.
7 And on at least one occasion, it appears that a pauper was excused from flogging after standing in the pillory.& But unlike the five-pound threshold, which persisted for hundreds of years, the practice of whipping and pillory (to the extent it actually happened) seemingly fell into disuse. Many of the sources that mention the possibility also doubt its continuing vitality. In 1698, Lord Chief Justice Holt denied a request to whip a nonsuited pauper, stating "he had no officer for that purpose, and never knew it done."" Matthew Bacon adds, "upon consideration of the circumstances of the case, it is in the discretion of the court to spare both [taxation of costs and whipping]."" And according to Blackstone, although "it was formerly usual to give such paupers, if non-suited, their election either to be whipped or pay the costs ... though that practice is now disused.""
Appeals
The English courts disagreed about paupers' appellate rights. In equity, it appears settled that a pauper could appeal. At law, however, the right may not have existed. In 1677, ChiefJustice North of the King's Bench stated that "[a] man admitted in forma pauperis is not to have a new trial granted him; for he has had the benefit of the King's justice once, and must acquiesce in it. We do not suffer them to remove causes out of Inferior Courts." 7 3 North's referral to a "new trial" seems to reflect the fact that, at common law, an "appeal" did not exist in the modern sense; and the closest analogy-suing out a writ of error-"was generally held to signal the commencement of a new suit."" Courts of equity, by contrast, viewed appeals as a continuation of the same cause, similar to 75 modern practice.
67.
Id.
68.
Book Note, supra note 37, at 268.
69.
Anonymous, (1698) 91 Eng. Rep. 433, 433 (KB.).
70.
5 BACON & GWILLIM, supra note 39, at 300 n.b.
71.
2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 38, at *400.
72.
See Drennan v. Andrew, (1866) 1 Ch. App. 300, 302-03 (concluding that paupers could appeal, although admitting that the historical record was ambiguous); see also id. 301-03 n.7 (summarizing historical controversy over paupers' right to appeal in the court of chancery). 
73.

75.
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Ineffective Assistance and Malpractice
No located authority indicates that a pauper could bring a case against his appointed attorney for the equivalent of what American law now calls ineffective assistance of counsel. But at least one case suggests that a pauper plaintiff could bring something like a malpractice action against his attorney-although that malpractice suit could not itself be in forma pauperis. In 1850, the Queen's Bench ruled on a case in which a plaintiff admitted in forma pauperis in a separate suit sought recovery from his attorney in that suit for the "costs of the day" the pauper was forced to pay, allegedly because of the attorney's misconduct.' 6 Whether the plaintiff could sue his attorney for compensation was not at issue. Rather, the Court examined whether the pauper was excused from paying costs in the action against his attorney-in essence, whether he could prosecute the malpractice action in forma pauperis. The Court held that the pauper was not excused. 7 If English courts followed this decision, they would have effectively barred poor persons from suing in forma pauperis in a malpractice action.
D. Repeal of 11 Hen. 7, c. 12 in England
In 1883, Parliament repealed 11 Hen. 7, c. 12. In its place, the English courts provided by rule that paupers could be "admitted in the manner heretofore accustomed," including the need for attorney certification and an affidavit of poverty, but raised the poverty threshold to twenty-five pounds.
7 " These rules preserved the court's discretion to appoint counsel.o Through various subsequent rules and statutes, the availability of civil counsel at no or reduced cost (depending on a litigant's financial situation) continues in Eng- The conduct remains unspecified. The attorney may have failed to prepare adequately for trial, thus requiring a continuance. Under such circumstances, the pauper plaintiff could be ordered to pay the "costs of the day for not proceeding to trial [.] Some states, without addressing the right to counsel, adopted 11 Hen. 7, c. 12's fee-waiver right." California did so in 1917, in the process quoting both the fee-waiver and right-to-counsel provisions of the statute. 9 ' Today, California courts continue to acknowledge I I Hen. 7, c. 12 as the source of Californians' in forma pauperis rights, and have expanded upon those rights with regard to expenses a litigant must normally pay up front."
Delaware's Chancellor Allen, citing 11 Hen. 7, c. 12, similarly held (in 1987) that the persistence of English common law in Delaware law gave him inherent authority to waive court costs "in a proper case."" Chancellor Allen set forth two factors to consider: (1) "the court should be satisfied that the plaintiff is in fact impecunious"; and (2) "the court must assess the allegations of the complaint to assure itself that, assuming the facts alleged to be true, a substantial claim is asserted and that the matter pressed is not frivolous or vexatious." 9 4 Chancellor Allen cited no authority for these factors, but they mirror the requirements established by English courts administering 11 Hen. 7, c. 12.
In Rhode Island, pre-1 7 50 English statutes "relating to the poor" remain in force in the state, and the state's supreme court held that this includes the cost-waiving provisions of 11 Hen. 7, c. 12, though it did not address the right to counsel. 9 
B. Federal Court
Given the prevalence of English right to counsel in state courts, it should not be surprising to find that the statute was also known in the federal courts. In 1894, for example, the D.C. Circuit discussed 11 Hen. 7, c. 12 in the context of an attempt to appeal in forma pauperis, which the court ultimately rejected. 9 0 In 1904, a convicted criminal similarly petitioned the Seventh Circuit to appeal his conviction in forma pauperis. The court analyzed the potential statutory sources of authority for such appeals, beginning with the statute of Henry VII:
By 11 Hen. VII, c. 12, every poor person having a cause of action against another could have writs according to the nature of his cause without payment of fees, and assignment of counsel by the court, who should act for him without reward. This statute came to us as part of the common-law existing at the time of the Revolution. It is followed as well by the federal as the state courts, unless the matter is otherwise regulated by "Civil Gideon"Litigation policy. Indeed, the foregoing analysis of the English courts' administration of the right raises many questions for modern implementation. Must an indigent litigant get an attorney's certification of merit? In which causes of action does the right to counsel attach? Is the right still restricted to plaintiffs at law, but open to both plaintiffs and defendants in equity?
These questions are important,1 but they should not preclude courts from recognizing the underlying right, given the flexibility courts have in determining how old law applies in modern contexts. The Colorado Supreme Court, for example, rejected the notion that incorporation of an English rule or statute necessarily means wholesale incorporation of every particular. In 1902, the Court held that the statute of 43 Eliz., c. 4, enacted in 1601, governs charitable trusts in Colorado "so far as it recognizes or indicates what are charitable uses, and in so far as it gives validity to gifts for such uses[, but] the details of the statute, and the remedies provided therein, are not applicable to our conditions or institutions, and are not in force here."l25 Seemingly, to the extent that the "details" of an English rule of law do not fit in modern contexts, courts need not adopt them.
Similarly, nothing in any English law incorporation statute that we are aware of requires that a rule, once incorporated, cannot be modified through case-by-case adjudication. This seems particularly true where states have incorporated common law and statutes in support thereof. Rules incorporated under these statutes have historically been subject to continued refinement by both English and American courts. At the very least, a court applying English law should not be afraid to do as the English courts did with respect to 11 Hen. 7, c. 12 and create procedural requirements suitable to the times.
Finally, English law incorporation statutes usually recognize the state legislature's authority to repeal incorporated English law. To the extent the courts establish a system that the legislature finds unworkable, the legislature has the final word. A court worried about overstepping its authority by recognizing the English right to counsel in America might therefore take comfort from the legislature's ability to make the ultimate determination regarding whether the right should continue in force.
CONCLUSION
In states that incorporated old English law, many other rights besides the right to counsel may be lurking in the "mists of early English [legal] history." 1 26 Nonetheless, if litigants argue for old English law, they should not do so halfheartedly. An abbreviated argument on a historically rich issue is a disservice to the court, is unlikely to succeed, and may create bad precedent.
Such should not be the case with the English right to counsel. Whether the English right still applies in any particular state turns on the requirements of that state's English law incorporation statute. At the very least, however, the existence and application of a civil right to counsel under old English law has substantial historical support. It therefore deserves serious consideration as the primary argument in support of Civil Gideon efforts. Perhaps more importantly, it reframes the Civil Gideon debate. Rather than an attempt to create a novel right, Civil Gideon can be legitimately seen as seeking to revive and perpetuate historically established rights-an area of common interest for many judges, regardless of ideological persuasion. [VOL. 45:3 656
